the war against Britain, she was engaged in military actions in Africa. The Soviet Union acted as a German ally in her occupation of eastern Poland (17 September 1939) and the Baltic countries, and in her attack on Finland on 30 November 1939. Germany supported the expansion of Russian influence towards the Persian Gulf, as the Commander-in-Chief of German Naval Forces, Grand Admiral Raeder, said in a briefing of his section chiefs 6 . In the spring of 1940, the British and French high commands became so worried about German troop movements in the Balkans, and about Soviet troop movements in southern Russia, that the Allied Supreme War Council, on the suggestion of Ministerpräsident Paul Reynaud, discussed the destruction of Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus in order to deny Germany access to their product, and in order to curb the military activities of the Soviet Union 7 . Baku and Batum were photographed by British intelligence air crews on 30 March and 3 April 1940, respectively. In June 1940 German forces captured in France Anglo-French plans for the destruction of the Caucasian oilfields 8 . The plans proved unrealistic; but apprehension grew about German and Russian advances through the Balkans and into Persia against the Anglo-Iranian oilfields 9 .
German plans for an invasion of the British Isles were postponed in July 1940. The German Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Fieldmarshal Walther von Brauchitsch, and his Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Franz Haider, discussed alternative moves against Britain on 30 July 1940. Japan's war plan was adopted at Imperial Headquarters on 5 November 1941 67 . It provided for the conquest, as a first step, of British Malaya, the Philippines, Hongkong, Guam, Wake; and, as a second step, for the conquest of Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Celebes, the Sunda Islands, Dutch Timor, the Bismarck Archipelagos, and Burma. Oilfields particularly were objectives of the offensive. It was begun with good prospects of success at a time when the colonial powers -France, Britain, the Netherlands -were engaged in Europe, and in the Mediterranean, where Britain had just launched an offensive in the Cyrenaica. The Japanese operation was designed to free Japan of dangerous American economic pressures, and to secure her freedom of action. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was launched to eliminate the American Pacific fleet which could have interfered with Japan's two-step southern offensive. The Japanese General Staff demanded adoption of a defensive strategy after these initial operations. They argued that Japan's war potential was inadequate for the defeat of Britain and America, and that the land war in China required all other resources 68 . The Japanese Admiral Staff, on the other hand, wished to continue the naval offensive. They wanted Australia "occupied before it could become a glacis for an aerial war of attrition against Japan. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, Rear-Admiral Ugaki, however, thought it more important to engage the American fleet through the occupation of Midway, Jonston, Palmyra and Hawaii. Finally, the Combined Fleet Staff First Operations Officer, Rear-Admiral Kamahito Kuroshima, proposed a western offensive into the Indian Ocean to destroy the British eastern fleet and, in conjunction with the Army, to occupy strategic points. Kuroshima urged a combined offensive by the Axis Powers in the Middle East to support the Japanese western offensive 69 .
The military agreements reached in Berlin on 18 January 1942 between Japan, Germany and Italy, however, failed to provide for common action in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean. Kuroshima's plan thus lacked its most important precondition, and it was not adopted when it was proposed at Imperial Headquarters on 27 January 1942 70 . The Combined Fleet pursued Kuroshima's plan independently, without Army support, and its offensive produced considerable successes. But it failed to locate and to destroy the British eastern fleet which withdrew to the East African Kilindini base and evaded a battle that could have ended in disaster 71 .
A few weeks after the failure of the attack on Moscow, on 3 January 1942, Hitler told Ambassador Oshima that he intended no further attack in the centre of the Russian front for the time being, but that he was going to attack in the south towards the Caucasus because he needed the oil of Iran and Iraq, and that he hoped to stimulate and support the Arab freedom movements 72 .
IV
Churchill cabled President Roosevelt on 4 and 5 March 1942 with requests for assistance in keeping the United Kingdom supplied with the necessities of war, and expressing grave concerns about the Japanese advances and the fate of the southern flank of Russia in the »attack which the Germans will deliver upon Russia in the spring« 73 In a memorandum to General Marshall dated 25 March, Eisenhower repeated this urgently:
»We are principally concerned in preventing the arise [sic] of any situation that will automatically give the Axis an overwhelming tactical superiority; or one under which its productive potential becomes greater than our own. The loss of either England or Russia would probably give the Axis an immediate ability to nullify any of our future efforts. The loss of the Near East or of England would probably give the Axis a greater productive potential than our own.
Consequently the immediately important tasks, aside from protection of the American continent, are the security of England, the retention of Russia in the war as an active ally, and the defense of the Middle East. In this connection the defense of the Middle East not only prevents the junction of our two most powerful enemies but it renders a definite support to the left flank of the Russian armies and keeps open an important supply line for Lend-Lease materials flowing to Russia. All other operations must be considered in the highly desirable rather than in the mandatory class.« »The importance of India and the Middle East (the area lying between the Red Sea and India) to eventual Allied victory can scarcely be overemphasized. Loss of the region would permit our two principal enemies to join hands, with the result that their economic, industrial and military position would be almost unassailable. Russia would be completely isolated on the south, and her position badly weakened. China will be completely isolated, and lost. One of the most valuable oil fields of the world, with an enormous productive capacity in the critical item of 100 octane gasoline, would be denied to us and would become available to the enemy. Loss of the Persian Gulf oil resources would prohibit Naval and air operations by the Allied Powers in all the great area lying between Madagascar and Australia. The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to an Allied victory. If the bulk of the German armies, now engaged against Russia, should become free for employment in the occupation and protection of Western Europe, any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be practically eliminated.« »(1) the Allies would be unable to support forces in the Middle East, and the Germans would gain access to oil and other resources of the area, and the Far East; (2) the loss of oil supplies from Abadan would be irreparable; (3) the southern supply route to the Soviet Union would be cut and (4) Turkey would fall an easy prey to tne Germans, and German naval forces would be able to enter the Black Sea and turn the Soviet position in the Caucasus.«
81
If the American and British assessments were not unduly pessimistic, the Allies were fortunate that neither Hitler nor the Japanese military leaders seized the opportunity of a combined Middle East and Indian strategy. Hitler pursued his Russian obsession, and Japan abandoned both the western and Australian options and turned to the operation against Midway with the aim of blocking supply routes between America and Australia, and to lure the American fleet into a decisive battle. The decision to launch the 68
Midway operation was reached in April 1942 82 . 
